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In a dynamíc, adverse selection lype of principal-agent relationship, where the principal is
committed over time to a particular incentiue sysrem (wilh fixed structure but variable
parameters) but not to any interlemporal incentiue scheme (with both fixed structure and
parameters), the ratchet eliect arises but varies with ditTerent incentive systems. We show that,
compared with using prices as the sole planning mode, the principal can attenuate the ratchet
elTect by stipulating targets as well. As a result, the target-incentive system entails higher
expected welfare than the price-incentive system in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1. Introduction
In large economic organizations the rights to make production decisions
are often delegated to subordinates (agents) engaging in production. The
central authority (the principal) performs the role of coordination and
maintains control through incentive schemes that specify the payments to the
agents based on their performance, taking into account that the agents may
have diverse interests which are in con(lict with that of the organization as a
whole, and have private information which is (prohibitively) costly to obtain
for the center. It is the very difference in access to information between the
principal and the agents that justifies delegating production decisions [see
Holmstri)m (1982)].
'This paper was written at CORE~IAG, U. C. Louvain-la-Neuve and revised substantially at
CcntER, Tilburg University and at the University of Limburg. I am deeply grateful to Claude
d'Aspremont and Maurice Marchand for their lalented supervision of my Ph.D. reseerch. 1 am
also grateful to a referee, whose insightful suggestions have significantly improved this paper.
Though errors are my own, I would also like to thank Svend Albaek, Vicky Barham, Eric van
Damme, Mathias Dewatripont, Fran~oise Forges, Roger Guesnerie, Kotaro Suzumura, Henry
Tulkens, and the participants at the International Conference of Organizations and Games at
CIRM Marseille-Luminy (or helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from ABOS~
AGCD and from CcntER are also gratefully aknowlcdged.
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Real world inccntive schemes most often take the form of a linear function:
the central authority sets up a price for a product and either 'purchases' the
whole output or lets the agent sell the product in the market at this price.
There is usually a lump-sum transfer of funds involved, taking the form of a
`subsidy' or `tax' according to its sign. We call such schemes 'price-incentive
schemes', and the class of such schemes a`priee-incentive system' (PIS). The
simplicity of the incentive schemes in practice can be partly explained by the
costs of writing complex schemes, but the principal-agent theory also
provides rich examples where price-incentive schemes are in fact optimal.t
Another advantage of the price-incentive schemes is their robustness to
(orecasting errors.
However, these advantages notwithstanding, the PIS often restricts the
central authorities' power to explore all the possibilities to maximize the
organizational welfare.2 This gives rise to the interest of looking at other
incentive systems that preserve most or all of the good properties of PIS but
allow the principal to non-trivially improve welfare.
In this paper we examine the welfare benefit to the principal of adding a
minimal required target variable to a price-incentive scheme. We call the
class of such schemes a`target-incentive system' (TIS) and each element of
TIS a'target-incentive schemè . More precisely, we allow the principal to set
a target of output and reward the agent according to a price (piece-rate) with
a lump-sum transfer only when the realized output is above or equal to the
target. This model applies to situations where the principal is quite sure
about the agent's capacity to achieve a certain production level. For example,
assume that the output is relatively independent of other non-observable
technological states and is only affected by the agent's hidden production
capacity, and that in the preceding period the agent has produced an output
level x, then the principal can require the agent to produce at least x in the
coming period.
Precise definitions of the PIS and TIS are given in the next section. It is
reasonable to assume that costs of writing a target-incentive scheme are more
or less at the same level of writing a price-incentive scheme, since targets are
usually easy to describe and understand. Since the minimal target can always
be set at zero, the TIS is obviously a more general class of schemes then the
'ln moral hazard models optimal incentive schcmes are linear when the agent is risk neutrel
[e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979)]. In simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection models the
optimal incentive mechanisms are a family of linear incentive schemes [e.g. Lalfont and Tirole
(1986)]. Reccntly Holmstr6m and Milgrom (1987) obtained further insight into the optimality of
linear incentive schemes. They showed that, even with risk-averse agents, lhe optimal incentivc
schemes should be linear functions of the observable variables when the agent's private action
space is sutficiently rich.
'Under asymmetrical information the second-best inantive schemes are rarely linear [e.g. see
Guesnerie and LaRont (1984) for adverse selection problems, Maskin and Riley (1984) for
monopoly pricing problems, Mirrlees (1971) for non-linear taxation problems).
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PIS and contains the PIS. Therefore, if the principal-agent relationship lasts
for only one period, the TIS is at least weakly superior to the PIS: any price-
incentive scheme is just a particular target-incentive scheme with a zero
target level. In fact this superiority is strict (Proposition 4).
However, most economic organizations are long-lasting in nature, where
planning and control activities happen periodically. The dominance of TIS
over PIS becomes doubtful in these repeated relationships. For one thing,
enlarging the principal's control set might aggravate the so-called 'ratchet
effect' and even the static superiority of the TIS might be upset by the agent's
strategic behavior. In this context, anticipating the principal's tendency to
update targets using revealed information, the agent may be induced to
choose suboptimal output levels in earlier periods in order to disguise his
true information and maximize the long-term information rents [e.g.
Weitzman (1980)]. Of course, similar strategie behavior may occur in the PIS
as well if the principal updates the prices using revealed information [e.g.
Freixas et al. (1985)]. Therefore we have to be explicit about these strategic
factors before drawing any conclusion concerning the relative long-term
welfare implications of the TIS and PIS.
Formally we consider a two-period principal-agent relationship. The
principal is committed over time to one of the two incentive systems, the PIS
and the TIS, and chooses an incentive scheme in each period from the pre-
committed incentive system.' We assume that the principal cannot commit
to any intertemporal incentive schemes, thus ratchet effects will arise and
vary with the committed systems. Our interest is to see how expected
organizational welfare is affected by the alternative policies of committing to
the PIS and the TIS. Recent studies of the ratchet effects provide useful tools
for our analysis [e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1987, 19g8), Freixas, Guesnerie and
Tirole (1985)]. Our model is constructed to be merely a slightly generalized
version of the one analyzed by Freixas et al. (1985); in this way, we are able
to capitalize on some of their analytical results.
An interesting observation in this paper is that, although it is the
widespread use of targets in centrally planned economies that has attracted
attention to the ratchet effect, the use of targets can actually mitigate such
effect i( the alternative is to use only prices (with lump-sum transfers) as
planning instruments. That is, if the principal is deprived of the right to set
targets, and is constrained to choose incentive schemes in the PIS, the
ratchet effect can be aggravated (in a probabilistic sense, Proposition 7). Put
differently, we find here an instance that commitment to the more restrictive
policies can hurt the principal and the organization as a whole, though the
agents will generally benefit. At first glance this result appcars to be at odds
'For instance, assume that an incentive system has been established and en(urced by law
before the principal assumes his authorily.
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with an insight in bargaining theory4 that it can be advantageous for a
bargaining party to 'tie its hands' by committing to a more restrictive
strategic set or "'incentivè' system' [in the sense of Schelling (1956, p. 300)].
The reason for this apparent `incongruity' in fact lies on the other side of the
coin. One just has to beware that tying one's hands does not always help: it
can hurt as well. In the present context, if the principal commits himself to
not using targets, i.e. to the PIS, the high productivity agent will enjoy
higher information rents than his rents in the TIS. Thus, if the agent reveals
his information in the first period, he will suffer a greater loss than in the
TIS in the second period. And this gives the agent a stronger incentive to
`cheat' in the first period in the PIS, which leads to a greater welfare loss for
the organization. Therefore if the TIS is available, it is never judicious for the
principal to commit to the more restrictive PIS.
The model is presented in section 2. As a preliminary step, complete
information results are derived. It is shown that with complete information
and certainty the TIS and the PIS are essentially identical since they both
entail the same level of welfare. Section 3 is devoted to derivations and
analyses of the optimal incentive schemes under single-period planning with
adverse selection. The strict welfare dominance of TIS over PIS in the static
relationship is proved in Proposition 4. Properties characterizing the optima
are also examined. In section 4 we first formulate the dynamic incentive
problem, then show in Proposition 6 the existence of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in both incentive systems. We then argue that for any first-period
incentive system, more desirable equilibria can result if there is precommit-
ment to the use of TIS, rather than PIS, in the second period (Proposition
7). The dynamic welfare dominance of the TIS over the PIS is eventually
proved in Proposition 9 and Proposition 10. Section 5 contains some
concluding remarks and conjectures.
2. The model
Consider a basic organizationa! structure with a principal and an agent
interacting in a decentralized planning environment. The relationship may be
best thought of as that between a central planner and a public firm manager,
although it is also suitable to be conceived as between a regulatory
department and a controlled private firm, between headquarters and a
subsidiary, etc. There are two periods t-1, 2, technologically identical.s Let
y, E Y- R. be a performance indicator for the agent in period t, publicly
`See, for example, the classic essay of Schelling (1956).
'By this assumption we exclude the possibility of having potential gains from renegotiation in
the presence of technological change.
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observable. y, might be taken either as the output of a particular good, or
simply the publicly observable revenue of the agent. Producing y, costs the
agent c(y,B)(C,, ~ 0, C,,,. ~ 0, and yields a payofT for the organization,
N(y,)(N' ~ 0, N" 5 0), both measured in terms of money. The coefficient 0 in
the cost function stands for technology, and may take two values: 0-L or
B-H (L~H). Assume C(y,L)~C(y,H) and C,,(y,L)~Cr(y,H) for all yeY,
i.e. with technology L both total and marginal costs are higher. Thus, H and
L denote 'high productivity' and 'low productivity', respectively.
The agent knows exactly the value of B from the outset; the principal's
knowledge of 6 is limited, and is characterized by a prior belief v, -
Prob {6 - L}. This belief is assumed to be common knowledge. The actual
cost incurred at the end of each period is not observed by the principal; were
this to be the case the problem would be trivial. In each period t, the
principal o(Ters the agent an incentive scheme S,(-): YF--.R, which specifies the
payment to the agent as a function of y,e Y. The agent may accept or reject
the o(ier in each period. In the case of a rejection, there is no further
production.
The price-incentiue system (PIS), denoted I'P, is defined as the set of
incentive schemes
I'P-{S(.)IS:yE Y~-.S(y)-afóyeR;a,beR}, (l)
where a may be interpreted as a lump-sum tax or subsidy according to its
sign, and 6 a controlled or transfer price for the good produced. The
superscript P denotes the price system. We see that I'P is merely a class of
linear functions defined on Y.
The target-incentiue system (TIS), denoted !'T, is defined as the set of
incentive schemes
r- afÍ~(y-i)eR, ify?t,I' -~S(.)~S:yEY-.S(y)-
OeR, ify~r, r~0,a,ilER~, Í~)
where r denotes the target, a the lump-sum transfer of funds, and ~i the
piece-reward for over-fulGllment of the target. The penalty for under-
production is formalized as the agent being deprived of any compensation. It
can be perceived as an approximation of the situations in which there is a
rigid quota, tloor or ceiling, etc. and violation in the wrong direction is not
allowed. Since the agent is assumed to be perfectly informed, under-
production (below the target level) will never happen and thus the actual
level of penalty is not essential. The elements of l'P and I'r will be denoted
by SP and Sr, and called price- and target-incentive schemes, respectively.
For notational convenience we introduce a variable hE {P,T}; when h is
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used as a superscript, the related expression is meant to be suitable for both
incentive systems. Assume that the agent is a profit maximizer with a zero
level of reservation profit (without loss of generality). The t-period profit for
agent 0 given an incentive scheme S," E!'" is
nh(Sh, )'~, ~) - Sh(Yr~) - C(Yh, V)~ ( 3)
The principal is concerned with maximizing ( social) welfare, which is
assumed to be the gross payoff, N(y"), less the cost of production, C(y,",(J),
and less a measure of the undesirable effect caused by the money transfer. A
standard formalization of this efTect, which we shall employ, is to associate a
unit cost ~l ~ 0 to the funds transferred to the agent.b Formally, the t-period
welfare given S," E I'" for each 8 is'
W ~(S~, Y~, ~) - NÍY~) - C(y,", ~) -~15;'(Y~). (4)
Let b be the common discount factor. With straightforward
total discounted profit and the total discounted welfare are:




W~(Si, Si,Yi,Yi, B)-Wi (Si,Yi, O)-i~bWi(Si,Yz,~)- (6)
2.1. Optimul results under complete injormution
lt is useful to first examine the case where the value of ~ is common
knowledge. Assume that the production is profitable for both types of agents.
In I'", the principal's objective is to design a sequence of schemes Si and S2
so that the total discounted welfare given by (6) is maximized subject to
n;'? 0, t- 1, 2. Let y"(S", 0) be the 0 agent's t-period profit-maximizing output.
Clearly, given complete information, the principal only needs to solve for S,"
in each period t, t- l, 2, from the program
óThere art many reasons why transferring funds is costly: raising funds through taxation may
have distortionary e(Tects; allowing the agent to reap extra profit (net of its production cosq may
have 'political costs' for an egalitarian government, etc. Note also that our ( social) welfare
function is analytically equivalent to the welfare function formaliud as a weighted sum of the
consumers' lxnefit plus the profit for the firm (agent) as in Baron and Myerson (1982). See
Freixas et al. (1985) for more discussions.
'For conciseness we use the same notation, S,", to denote lwth an incentive scheme and a
particular payment. Similarly, y" may denote lwth agents' strategic response to an incentive
scheme and a particular output level. The context will help exclude any confusion.







s.t. rz~ (Sh, Y~ (S„ 0), 0) ? 0. (g)
One can easily verify (see fig. 1) that there is a unique optimal output y'(0),
identical in both periods, that maximizes W;' subject to (8), and satisfies
Cy(Y`(0), 0) - N~(Y`(0))~( i ~- ~i)`~!V'(Y`(0)). (9)
The optimal output, y'(0), can be induced through the optimal incentive
schemes in either incentive system. We call ÏV(y) the uirtua! payoJj function.
Fig. 1 shows that at y'(B), the vertical distance between N(y) and C(y,0), is
maximized, and (9) says that this optimal output is characterized by the
equality of marginal cost and the marginal virtual payoff of production. The




S`P(Yt, 0) - S'P(Y[, 0) - a'(0) t G'(0)Y[,
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whcrc
b'(~) - c,.(Y`(o), o), (10)
ct'(lll -C(t~`((l),l))-b'(~))''(~). (11)
and
S'T(Yi. ~) - S'T(Yn e) -{




a'(~) - C(Y~(~), ~),
~'(B) ~ C,.(Y'(B), 8).
(12)
(14)
If b'(~) satisfies ( l0), the agent chooses y'(t7) as his profit-maximizing output.
Eqs. (11) and ( 13) are equivalent to n;(S'", y'(f3), 6) - 0, t-1, 2, i.e. the agent
is put at the minimal profit level because transferring funds is costly. Eq. (12)
says that the target equals the desired output, and (14) ensures that the agcnt
has no incentive to deviate from the targeted output. Henceforth we denote
the single-period optimal welfare under complete information by W'(~) -
W"(S'"(y'(~),~),y'(B),9). The total discounted welfare is consequently
(1 fb)W'(~). It is clear that in an environment with complete information
the P1S and the TIS entail the same level of welfare.
3. Incentive systems in a one-period relationship with incomplete information
In this section we study the case where the principal-agent relationship
lasts for only one period. We use the notation introduced in the preceding
section, except that the subscript t is omitted.
Under incomplete information it may be optimal to shut down agent L
when v is small. Let vP and vT denote the `cut-off belief in the PIS and TIS,
respectively: if vSvT (or vP) agent L will be induced to quit; otherwise both
types of agent will produce. Our research strategy is as follows. We first
analyze the problem as though a cut-off belief, v", exists and is given in each
incentive system, and focus on the cases where v~v", i.e. where both agents'
individual rationality constraints must be satisfied. Then, when sufficient
insights are obtained, we show the existence of such cut-off beliefs. Let
v - max { rT, vP}.
Now let a cut-off bclief, v", be given for h- P, T. Suppose v e(v",1). Given
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an incentive scheme S"e!'", and the agent's optimal response strategy,
y"(S", B) e Y, the expected síngle-period welfare is
E(W"ISA,v)dervW"(S",Y"(S",L),L)t(1-V)W"(S",y"(S",H),H). (15)
The principal's problem is given by
max E( W" I S", v) (16)
Shf i~
P":
s.t. n"(S", y"(S", B), ~) ? 0, B- L, H. (17)
The following assumptions on the cost structure are made to ensure that
the second-order conditions for program P" are met.
Asswnption 1. C,.,,,,(y, B) ? 0, for all y E Y, 0- L, H
Assumption 2. For x e Y and z E Y such that C~.(x, L) - Cy(z, H), the cost
functions satisfy (1 f 2.?)Cyy(x, L)1.iC,,,,(z, H).
Assumption 1, (29), and (20) imply y"~0, i.e. the marginal rate of output
w.r.t. reward or price is non-inereasing. Since usually .i is small, Assumption
2 is not as restrictive as it appears. Assumptions 1 and 2 are maintained
throughout this paper.
3.1. Op~iniul solulions ~o PT in rhe T1S
Clearly, given ST, no under-fulfillment of the target may occur. The
profit-maximizing output, yT(ST,B), for agent B, given that the resulting profit
is non-negative, must satisfy
yT(ST, ~) - T, IIT Cy(T, B) ?~3,
yT(ST, ~) -Y(~, B), iff Cr(T, 8) c~,
where y(Q, B) is defined by




We use the triple (T, a, ~3) interchangeably with ST to designate a target-
incentive scheme. To facilitate derivation we first single out a simple fact
concerning an optimal (T, a, ~).




t ~- Y(11~L) Y~I~~~)
Fig. 2
Y
Lemma l. !n search oJ a solution ( t, a, ~) to program PT, there is no loss of
generality ta restrict attention to the schemes satisfying CY(r, H) c~3 c Cr(t, L).
Proof. For any target scheme (t, a, ~) with ~~ C,,(t, L) (see fig. 2), agent L
will choose to produce y(~3, L), which satisfies condition (20). We may design
another scheme, (i,á,~), with i-y(~3,L), á-af~(y(~3,L)-t), and ~-~. It is
easily seen that (i, á, ~ achieves the same result as does (r, a, ~3) but with
~3 5 Cr(i, L).
For a target scheme with (t c C,(r, H), since both types of agent will react
by producing exactly the assigned target r, it dces not alter the choice of
either agent, nor their payments, if ~f increases to ~-C,(r, H). Q.E.D.
Lemma I implies that the principal can rely on target-incentive schemes
that induce agent L to just fulfill the imposed target. In fact this is necessary
for a target-incentive scheme to be an optimal solution to PT (Proposition 2).
The lump-sum payment, a, should be set so as to make at least one of the
constraints in (17) binding. The binding constraint must be that of agent L,
since agent H can always produce yT(ST, L) with a lower cost. Thus
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a - C(T, L). (21)
By Lemma 1 and the conditions (18)~21), we may write yT(ST, L) - T,
yT(ST, H) - y(Q, H), and reduce PT to
max E( WT ~(T, Q), v)a~v[N(T)-(1 t).)C(T, L)]
T, ~
f( t - Y) CN(Y(Q, H)) - C(Y(Q, H), H)
- z(~(T, L) t Q(Y(Q, H) -T))7
s.t. C,,(T, H) ~ Q 5 C,,(T, L).
(22)
(23)
Proposition 1. For ve(vT, 1), there exists a unique target scheme
(T(v),a(v),Q(v)) which solues the program (22)-{23); it is diJferentiable in v on
(vT, I) and satisfes ( 21) and
C,,(T' L) -~} V(v(1 f~)!3'(T) t(1 - Y) ~Q),
(N~(Y(Q, H)) - Q)Y(Q, H) - 1 t .i
(Y(Q, H) - r).
( 24)
(25)
Proof. See the appendix. The proof uses Assumptions 1 and 2 and amounts
to a straight-forward check of the first- and second-order conditions. From
the characterization in Proposition 1 we derive some useful properties
regarding the optimal results:
Proposition 7. If (T,a,Q) solues PT, then
(t) N~(Y(Q, H)) ~ Cy(Y(ih H), N) -Q,
(ii) N'(T) ~ C,,(T, L) ~ Q.
(26)
(27)
Proof. (i) (18)-(20) and (21) imply y(Q,H)?T. If y(Q,H)-T, then from (20)
Cy(T,H)-Q. This, however, cannot be true, for else by (24) and (25) we would
have C~(T, L) - Q- C,,(T, H), which contradicts the assumption C,,(y, L) ~
C~( ~., H) for all y E Y. Thus, y(Q, H) ~ i. It follows from (20) that y'(Q, H) ~ 0
and from (25) that
N'O'(Q, H)) - CY(Y(Q, N), H) - N'(Y(Q, H)) -Q
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- À Y(I~.H)-t~o.
- 1 f 1. Y~(~, H)
(ii) From ÍV" ~ 0 and (i), N'(T) ~~. This fact with (24), which says that
C,.(r, L) is a convex combination of 1V'(t) and Q, immediately implies
(27). Q.E.D.
It is easy to derive from Proposition 2 that for a solution (t, a, ~) to PT,
C,,(t, H) ~Q ~ C,,(t, L); i.e. constraint (23) is not binding. We saw in the
previous section that under complete information either (26) or (27) must
hold with equality for an optimal incentive scheme, depending on which fi
occurs. Undcr incomplete information, however, both relations cannot be
satisfied by a single scheme; hence, there has to be a compromise between
the two. This is given simultaneously in (24) and (25). In (24) the marginal
cost for agent L, C,,(t, L), is a weighted average of the marginal vírtual
payo(T, J1~'(t), and the piece-rate of reward, ~. The weight assigned to 1'V'(t)
and Q varies with the principal's belief v, the probability that 6-L. C,,(t,L) is
closer to 1V'(r) as v becomes larger and equals ÍV'(i) when v takes the
extreme value of one. In (24) and (25), if the unit cost of funds ~i goes to zero,
the equations become identical to the characterization of the complete
information output, (]0) and (14), which implies t-y'(L) and y(Q, H) - y'(H).
This corresponds to a Groves mechanisme which achieves socially efTicient
production in both states L and H but allows agent H to reap (probably
enormous) rents. Proposition 2 implies also that the marginal cost of
production is strictly smaller than the marginal virtual payoff for both B-L
and () - H, which implies t c y'(L) and y(~, H) c y'(H). The relative magni-
tudes of the various output levels are shown in fig. 3. To obtain some
intuition, it is useful to rewrite the principal's utility (for a given B) as
W"(s", Y", o) - N(Y") - c(y", o) -~s"(Y")
-(1 -f ).) [N(Y") - C(Y"s O)7 - 1.n"(S", y", (I). (28)
This utility function consists of two parts. The first part is a linear function
(with a positive coefl'icient) of what we may call the virtual socia! benefit:
ÏV(y")-C(y",0); the second part is a linear function of the agent's profit [with
'View the model ( with ~i~0) as a revelation game played by two players, the consumers and
the agent, concerning their preference for a public good. y'(L) (respectively, y'(H)] is the
optimal output decísion (concerning the public good production ye Y) that maximius the sum
of the consumers' valuation N( ) of y (which is public knowledge) plus the agent's reported
valuation -C( ,L) [respectively, -C(-,N)] of y. It is easy to verify that the optimal target-
incentive scheme derived from (21), (24), and (2S) fits well with a Groves transfer rule. See Green
and La(iont ((977).
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C(y, H)
Fig. 3
negative coefGcient (- ~)]. When 9 is known, the optimal output, y'(0),
maximizes the virtual social benefit ( i.e. the distance between A and B for
~- L and between E and F for B- H) and at this level the agent gets zero
profit. When ll is unknown, however, the principal is torn between maximiz-
ing the expected virtual social benefit and minimizing the agent's profit
(subject to non-negative protit constraints). Agent L's profit can always be
put at zero, but there is a probability of 1- v that the agent is of type H and
gets strictly positive profit (or rents), measured by the distance between C
and D. To reduce these rents, some virtual social benefit has to be sacrificed,
which leads to suboptimal levels of production: t ~ y'(L) and y(~3, H) ~ y'(H).
3.2. Optimu! solutions to PP in the PIS
Let (a, b) denote a price-incentive scheme: SP( y) - a t by E !'P. Agent 4
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chooses the output yP(SP,B)-y(6,9) according to the profit-maximizing
condition
Cy( y(b, B), ~) - b, B- L, H, ( 29)
provided the resulting profit is non-negative. By (29), y'(b, B) ~ 0 and y(b, H) ~
~~(b,L). Parallel to (21), the lump-sum payment should be set such that
a-C(y(b, L), L) - by(b, L). ( 30)
Inserting ( 30) into ( 16) and ( 17) gives the principal's problem in the PIS as
max E(W" ~ b, v)`~v[Ny(b, L)) -(1 f~)C(y(b, L), L)]
6
f(1 - v)[N(y(b, H))- C(y(b, H), H)
-~i(C(Y(b, L), W) f b(Y(b, F1) -Y(b, L))]. (31)
Proposition 3. For vE(vP, 1) there exists a unique price-incentice scheme
(a(v),b(v)) whuch so(ves the program (31); it is diJJerentiable on (vP, I) and
satisfies ( 30) and -
v( N'( y(b, L)) - b)y'(b, L) t( L - v)( IV'( y(b, H)) - b)y'(b, H)
- 1 f:~ (1
- v)(Y(b, H) -Y(b, L)).
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1, and hence is omitted.
it is easily seen that for v ~ 1,
N'( y(b, L)) ~ b,
(32)
(33)
because otherwise the signs on each side of the eq. (32) would be incompat-
ible. This implies that the marginal cost of production is strictly smaller than
the marginal virtual payoff for agent L in the PIS as well. By Propositions 1
and 3, we may denote respectively by SP(v) [or (a(v),6(v))] and ST(v) [or
(t(v),a(v),~3(v))] the optimal solutions to PT and PP defined on (v",1).
Recall that so far we have been neglecting the possibility of agent L
quitting. In that case the principal can obtain expected welfare (1-v)W'(H).
It is easy to verify that the function {"(v)'~(1- v) W'(H) - E(W" ~ S"(v), v) is
strictly decreasing in v(and also continuous), which becomes positive for v
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sufficiently small and negative for v sufficiently large. Thus for h- P, T, there
exists a cut-off belief v" which is determined by
~"(~") - ~, (34)
such that for v~ v" the solution to P" is optimal and for v ~ v" the optimal
scheme is simply S'"(H). -
.3.3. Pre(iminary comparative results
Let n"(v) denote agent H's maximum profit under the optimal incentive
scheme: a"( v) - 0 for v ~ v", and for v~ v"
nP(v) - C(Y(b(v), L), L) -f-b(v)CY(b(v), F1) -Y(b(v), L)~
- C(y(b(v), H), H), (35)
nT(v) - C(Tlv), W f~(v)CY(~(v), H) -Tlv)~ - C(Yl~(v), H), fl). (36)
Since in the final period of the dynamic relationship the rcmaining
planning problem reduces to a static problem, given the principal's belief
about the distribution of 9 in that period, and the last-period belief may in
turn intluence the decisions in the previous period of each party, it is of
crucial importance to understand how relevant single-period variables and
utilities would change with this belief.
Lemma 2. For v e( v", 1),
(i) t'(v)~0 and ~3'(v)~0,
(ii) b'(v) ~ 0.
That is, at the optimal solution to P", the target and piece-reward in the TIS
and the price in the PIS all increase with tlte probability oJ agent L's
occurrence.
Prouf. See the appendix.
Lemma 3. For vE(v",1), n"'(v)10.
Proof. From Lemma 2(ii),
nP~( v) - b'(v)CY(b( v), H) -Y(b( v), L)~ ~ ~,
and from Lemma 2(i) and Proposition 2,
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nT (~~) -~Cy(T. L) -~(v)~ T~( v) f(Y(Q,1~) - t)~f~( v) i 0.
Q.E.D.
The above lemmas are extensions of similar results in Freixas et al. (1985).
As they recognize, the result that agent H's profit strictly increases with the
principal's probability assessment of 9-L provides the very reason why
agent H tends to mimic agent L. Another useful result is given by
Lemma 4. For v e(~ 1), ~3( v) c b( v).
Proof. See the appendix.
For later use let rzP(1-)a-``lim~ti, rzP(v) and nT(1 -)d-``lim~~., rzT(v). What is
vital for our comparative analysis is agent H's relative levels of utilities in the
TIS and the PIS. We will show below (Proposition 10) that in quite general
situations rzT(v) ~ nP(v) for v7 v with v arbitrarily given. A more immediate
result is - -
Lemma S. Let s -11~'( y'( L)).
(i) lim,,y, ~(v)-Q` cs.
(ii) There exists v' c 1 such [hat for ve(v, 1) n(v', 1), rzT(v)SrzP(v).
Proof. (i) First note that by taking the limit in (24), limyy, r(v) - y'(L).
From Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 there exists a limit Q} such that
~3'-limyy,~(v)~Iim,y,Cv(t(v),L)-s. Thus, we only need to show that
~3' ~s. Suppose, on the contrary, that ~3' -s. By the assumption that Cyy~O,
y'(~l, H) - 1 ~Cyy is different from infinity for all QE R. Now take the limit in
(2S) as ~ goes to s. The right-hand side of (2S) would be strictly positive
while the left-hand side of (2S) would be (weakly) negative, which is a
contradiction. Therefore ~} ~s.
(ii) Taking limits in (3S) and (36), and by the mean value theorem and
~ s, we have
rzP(1- ) - rzT(1- ) - s ~Y(s, E1) - Y'( L)] - ~Q } (Y(Q } , N) - Y~`( ~-))
fk(Y(s,F1)-Y(Q},F1))] (Q} ~k~s)
~ (s - k)(Y(s, H) -Y'(L)) ~ 0.
~
.
Since nh(v), h-P,T, are continuous on (v, 1) there must exist an v' c 1 such
that nT 5 rz" on (v, 1) n(v', 1). Q.E.D. - -
From Lemmas 4 and S the piece-reward in the TIS is always strictly
smaller than the optimal price for ve(v, 1]. This is an interesting property.
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Note that if v- 1, the optimal incentive scheme is such that ~3(1) -~3'(L) ~ s
[see (14)], and ~3(1) can be equal to s. Put difTerently, there is only onc
`stable' optimal piece-reward at v- 1 which equals ~f'; other piece-reward
levels, ~3'(L)~~3', though optimal at v-1, become suboptimal and will jump
to ~' if we allow estimation errors on v.
The next proposition shows that the single-period expected welfare in the
TIS is strictly higher than that in the PIS.
Proposition 4. vT c vP and for v e[0, 1],
E( WT ~(t(v), a(v), ~t(v)), v) ? E( WP I(a(v), b(v)), v) (37)
with strict inequality jor vE(vT, 1).
Proof. Suppose first that v E(~ 1), and let (a, b) be the optimal solution to
PP. Consider a target-incentive scheme (r, a, ~3) such that t- y(b, L), a-
a t by(b, L), and ~- b. This (t, a, ~f) is mcrely a duplicate of (a, b) for
y? y(b, L), hence
E( WT ~(T, a, ÍI), v) - E( W P ~(a, b), v). (38)
But with (r, a, ~3) so defined, we have Cr(t, L) -~3, and by Proposition 2(ii) it is
not a solution to PT. Thus, for a target-incentive scheme (T,a,~3) to be
optimal for PT, (37) must hold with strict inequality. It follows immediately
that vT~vP [see (34)] and thus the strict inequality holds for vE(~~T, 1). In the
other cases the expected welfare levels in both systems are equal. Q.E.D.
In the above proof we see that given an optimal price-incentive scheme
(a, b), there is an equivalent target-incentive scheme which achieves the same
result as in (a, b) with the target t equal to y(b, L). This target-incentive
scheme is not optimal in the TIS. There are two possible ways to improve it:
either by increasing the target t from the level of y(b, L) while keeping the
slope Q-6 constant, or by reducing the slope ~f from the level of b while
keeping t- y(b, L). For more intuition consider the latter case (see fig. 4),
which is likely to happen if v is large. In the (a,b), the curve passing through
B and F is agent H's indifference curve. If we reduce the slope from the level
of b to J3, agent H will reduce production by producing y(~3, H) ~ y(b, H), and
suffer a reduction of profit measured by the distance between B and C. We
may perceive the output reduction as a'substitution effect': the change along
the same indifference curve of agent H from F to B, and the profit reduction
as an 'income effect': the vertical change from B to C. When v is close to 1,
the shift from F to C has no effect in state L and has (very) little e(ï'ect in
state H on the virtual social benefit [compare the distance between E and G
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and betwccn A and D, see also Lemma 4(iii)], but it has more significant
e(Tect on agcnt H's profit. By (28), this reduction of price ((3 instead of b)
improves welfare.
4. Incentive systems in a two-period relationship with incomplete information
4.1. Dynamic ganre and continuation equilibrium
We follow the existing literature to model the problem as a sequential
game with incomplete information. The game contains five stages (see fig. 5).
In stage zero, one of the incentive systems of TIS and PIS, !'", is established
and fixed for both periods. In stage one, Nature chooses 9 with Prob {9-
L} - vt and Prob {B- H} - 1- vt. While this probability is common know-
ledge, only the agent is informed of the true value of 9. In stage two, the
principal chooses a first-period incentive scheme, S~, from f" and offers it to
the agent. [n stage three the agent produces yi in response to S~ at cost
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Fig. 5. Game tree highlighting the equilibrium paths. The shaded areas are the information sets.
The probabilities of playing the corresponding strategy are in parentheses. The principal's
probability assessments of his position in the information set are in square brackets. The term
'others' denotes all the output levels deviating from y~S;,L) and ys(S;,fl). The probability of
reaching this information set is zero, thus the posterior beliefs in this set can be specificd
somcwhat arbitrarily, provided that they are Bayes consislent [see Kreps and Wilson (1982)].
C(y;,9), receives a reward S;(yi). In the following stage the principal chooses
another incentive scheme, S2, from !'". Finally, the agent responds to S2 by
producing y"Z, and receives the second-period payment, SZ(y"Z). Details of the
game tree depicted in fig. 5 will be clear shortly.
Similar to the preceding research strategy we assume that there is a'non-
degenerate set', V;, such that for v, e V; it is optimal to induce both types of
agents to produce, and to shut down agent L from the outset otherwise.9




9We are not sure if V~ is an interval as it was in the static case, because knowing the shape of
an optimal total discounted expected welfare is dilTcult without a more claborate analysis of the
PB equilibria. But it dces not matter for our analysis.
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The two partners' respective payoffs in this dynamic game, i.e. the total
discounted profit for the agent and the total discounted welfare for the
principal, are given in (5) and (6). The principal's strategy is a sequence of
incentive schemes, S~ and S2,to both selected from the incentíve system !'".
The strategy of the agent is a sequence of outputs, y; and y2, chosen from Y.
Let vZ denote the principal's probability assessment of 4-L at the start of
the second-period. v2 will depend on vt, the agent's first-period strategy and
the observed first-period output, as well as the first-period incentive scheme
actually adopted.
The notion of perfect Bayesian (PB) equilibria is suitable for analysis. A
PB equilibrium in !'" is a set of (possibly mixed) strategies and beliefs
{S;, y;, S2, y2, v2 } satisfying sequential optimality and the Bayes rule [see
Freixas et al. (1985) and Laffont and Tirole (1987)]. In the present context, a
PB eyuilibrium satisfies the following five conditions:
CI. yZ is optimal for the agent given SZ.
C2. S2 is optimal for the principal given his belief v2.
C3. y; is optimal for the agent given S; and the fact that the principal's
second-period belief depends on the observed first-period output.
C4. S; is optimal for the principal given the subsequent strategies.
CS. v1 is Bayes-consistent with the principal's prior belief vt and the agent's
first-period strategy and the observed first-period output.
The derivation of a PB equilibrium is analytically complicated. But since
the comparative analysis does not hinge upon explicit calculations of PB
equilibria, the major part of the analysis can be carried out using a less
stringent notion of equilibrium, namely the con[inuation equilibrium. A
continuation equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies and beliefs satisfying
the conditions for a PB equilibrium except that S~ is arbitrarily given. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium is simply an optimal (for the prineipal) continua-
tion equilibrium. It turns out that the existence of a PB equilibrium holds in
both the TIS and the PIS (Proposition 6).
The continuation equilibrium (henceforth often called an equilibrium) has
'oT"he argumcnts of the strategies and beliefs are often omitted for brevity.
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been analyzed by Freixas et al. (1985) in a similar context. In what follows
we first summarize their results concerning the existence and uniqueness of a
continuation equilibrium of the sequential game. It is shown that there exists
one and only one continuation equilibrium for any first-period incentive
scheme in either incentive system. Consequently, the principal's welfare-
maximizing problem is well defined. We will then formulate explicitly the
principal's dynamic optimization problem and show that a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium exists in either incentive system."
Given S; e 1'~, let y(S;, U) denote agent U's single-period, profit-maximizing
output and y;(S;,U) his first-period output taking into account the second-
period strategies. A first result related to agent L's strategy is that yi(S;,L)-
y(S;, L). This is because, according to our analysis in the previous section,
whatever the principal's second-period belief is, agent L can never make a
profit higher than his reservation level in the second period. Given this, agent
H's first-period strategy should be either y; (S; , H) - y(S;, L) or y'; (S; , H) -
y(S;, H). Indeed, if a level of first-period output other than y(S~, L) is
observed, from agent L's strategy and the Bayes rule, the principal's posterior
belief about the agent's type will be Prob {U- L} -0, which implies ihat
agent H will be offered S2-S'"(H) and put at his zero rescrvation utility
Icvel in the second period. Therefore y;(Si,H) ouglit to maximize agcnt H's
first-period profit, i.e. it must be y(S~,H), unless the agent chooscs to
produce y(S;, L).
As a result, in a continuation equilibrium agent L produces y(S;, L), and
agent H assigns a probability x"e [0, 1] to producing y(S;, H) and 1-x~ to
producing y(S;, L). By [he Bayes rule the principal's second-period prob-
ability assessment of U- L is v2(Si, v,, y(S;, H))-0 if he observes y(S;, H) and
v2(S;,vt,y(Si,L))-v,~(v, f(1 -vl)(1-x")) if he observes y(S;,L). We would
say that a continuation equilibrium is pooling if x~-0, separating if x~- l,
and semi-separating if x"E(0, 1). ~
If agent H chooses to produce y(S~,L) in the first period, some short-run
profit, denoted f1~(S;), is forgone. It is given by
~h(Si )- ni ÍSi~ 1'(Si ~ H), H) - rzi (Si, Y(Si, l-), H)- (39)
Agent H may also expect a gain in the second period by choosing y(S;, L),
the present value of which is brz(v2). Comparing f2h(S~) with brt(vZ) gives:
Prupositiun S. For any S; E I'~, there exists one and only one contirtuutiun
eyuilibriunt the type oj which is determined us jollows:
"There may be multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria, but it dces not pose a problem here since
the principal moves first and each first-period incentive scheme leads to a unique continuation
eyuilibrium.
(~)
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It is a pooling equilibrium if and only if
~~( Si)~ b n~( v t).
(ii) It is a separa[ing equilibrium if and only ij
n~(s; ) ? sn"(1- ).
(iii) It is a semi-separating equilibrium if and only if
l~Tth(V 1)Cnh(S1)G CS1[h(1 -).




Since tr"(v) is continuous and strictly increasing in v, condition (42) is
equivalent to saying that there exists a vZe(vl, 1) such that
~~(Si ) - bn(vi).
The one-to-one relationship between v2 and x" is given by
V2 -V1,(Vl f(1 -VI)(1 -X~))-
(43)
(44)
Recall that vZ is the principal's posterior belief conditional on the
observation of y(S~,L) given agent H's first-period strategy x~ [x"-0
corresponds to (40) and x"- 1 to (41)]. By Proposition S, for any given S;
there is a unique first-period equilibrium strategy completely given by
z"e[0,1] for agent H, which is derived from conditions (40), (4l), (43), and
(44) via v2.
4.?. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Given S~, and hence x", the probability of observing y(S;,L) in the first
period is v,f(1-vl)(1-x"). The probability of observing y(Si,H) is
( I- v, )x~. When y(S;, L) is observed, the second-period expected welfare will
be E( W" I S2, v2) as defined in (15). L,et W"(vZ) denote maxsq E( W" ~ SZ, v2)
subject to the agent's non-negative profit constraint [as in (17)]. The a priori
expected second-period welfare, denoted W2, can then be written as
W2 -(~~1 f(1 -V1)(Í -X")) W~(vi)f(1 -vl)x"W'(H). (45)
Notice that the first-period lump-sum transfer of funds, at or at, does not
appear in S2"(S~), and therefore does not in(luence the second-period
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strategics. Assuming that both agent's rationality constraints should be met,
i.e. v, E Vi, we have the binding condítions:
a, - C(y(b[, L), L) - b,Y(b,, L) (46)
and
a, - C(z„ L). (47)
These equations define a, and a, as functions of b, and ( il,(i,), respectively.
Thus, we only need to consider the principal's first-period decision variables,
b, and (i„Q,), respectively. The following is an analogous result to that
given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. There is no loss oj generality to restrict at[ention to C,,(T,, H) ~
Q, SC,,(t,,L) in search ojan optimal (a[,i,,Q[).
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1, and hence is omitted; the only additional
consideration is that of the influence of this restriction on i2~(S;).
By Lemma 6 we may write y(Si, L) - t[ and y(S~, H) - y(Q, , H). As to the
price-incentive scheme, we always have y(S„ L) - y(b,, L) and y(SP, H) -
y(b, , H). The cost of concealing information for agent H, fl"(S; ), can now be
more explicitly expressed as
~P(S1 ) - ~P(bl )
-6[(Y(b,,H)-Y(b[,L))-[C(Y(b[,H),H)-C(Y(b„W,17)], (48)
nT(SI)-~T(TI,QI)
- Q,(Y(Q,, H) - t, )- CC(Y(Q,, H), H) - C(T,, H)]- (49)
Let us state a simple but important fact before writing out the welfare
functions in detail.
Lemma 7. In the T1S (PIS), it is neuer optima! to induce a pooling or
semi-separating equilibrium sueh that v2 c vT (v2 c vP).
Proof. Because v, S v2 5 v~, and given these beliefs, the separating scheme,
S'~(H), which forces agent L to quit is superior to any other schemes in both
periods [see ( 45) and use W"(v2)S(1-v2)W'(H)]. Q.E.D.
This lemma implies that if agent L does not quit in the Grst period he
74 L. Zou, Target-incentiue system vs. price-incenriue system
should not be induced to quit in the second period. For the moment assume
v, e V,. By Lemma 7 we can write
Wi(L) `~r N(y(b t, L)) -(1 f .i) C(y(b t, L), L), ( 50)
W;(L)`~N(r,)-(1 f.i)C(T,,L), (51)
i.e. the first-period welfare when ~-L;
W;(L~H)2`-rN(y(b,,L))-C(y(b,, L),H)-~ïC(y(b,,L),L) (52)
Wi(L~H)a~rN(tl) - C(r,, H) -.iC(I,, LJ, (53)
i.e. the first-period welfare when B- H and agent H produces y(b,, L) under
TP and t, under !'T in the first period;
Wi(H)~`rN(1'(bt, H)) - C(Y(bt, H), t1)
-~~C(Y(b,, W f bt(Y(bt, H)-Y(bt, L))~, (54)
Wi(H)a~rN(Y(Í3t, H)) - C(Y(~t, H),1-1)
-~ LC(i t, L) t~t(y(Íl t, H) - t t)~, (55)
i.e. the first-period welfare when B-H and agent H produces y(b„H) or
y(~,,H) in the first period.
The first-period expected welfare, given S~ and the subsequent equilibrium
strategies, can be written as
W~-v,W~(L)t(1-v,)(1-x")W~(L~H)-f-(1-v,)x"W~(H). (56)
Finally, the total discounted expected welfare in each of the two systems
istZ
E( WP, xP I b,, v,) - W; f bW2, (57)
EIWT,xT~(it,Qt),vt)- W; fbWZ. (58)
The principal's first-period optimization problem is either to choose b, to
maximize (57) in the PIS, or to choose the target-bonus pair (t,,~l) to
12The term x" nced not be made explicit in (57) and ( 58) in equilibria since it is determined
once S~ is given. However, it is useful for consequent analysu.
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maximize ( 58) [subject to C(tt,L)zQtzC(t1,H)] in the TIS. It is easy to
obtain
Propositionó. (i) For v1EV1, E(WP,xPlbt,vt) and E(WT,xTI(tt,~3r),vt) are
continuous in bl and in (Tl,~t) respectiuely. Therejore
(ii) A perject Bayesian equilibrium exists under both PIS and TIS.
Proof. See the appendix. The proof amounts to a straightforward check of
continuity at x"-0 and z"-1, and of the fact that the total discounted
expected welfare declines when bt or tt is sufiiciently large.
By this proposition, the optimal total discounted expected welfare is well
defined as a function of vr. It is given by E( W", x" ~ S,(vt ), v, )[see (57) and
(58)]. Let {i(vt)`~t(1-vl)(lfb)W'(H)-E(W",x"~S,(vt),vl). The non-
degenerate set V; can now be defined as V~`~t {vt e (0, t) ~{; (v, ) ~ 0}. This set
is not empty because {;(v,)~0 for v, sufficiently close to l.
4.3. T!S vs. P!S
We now proceed to compare the TIS with the PIS in the dynamic setting.
We first show that given a first-period incentive scheme, agent H assigns
higher probability to revealing his private information if the precommitted
second-period incentive system is the TIS rather than PIS, provided that v,
is high enough. We then prove that for a given first-period incentive scheme
a higher probability of truth revelation entails a higher total discounted
expected welfare. These properties imply that as long as vt is high enough
the TIS dominates the PIS in achieving a higher discounted welfare. Finally,
under further restrictions on the benefit and cost functions we show that for
all v e(v, 1), aT 5 n', and hence the TIS dominates the PIS for all v, E[0, 1]
for the specified class of benefit and cost functions.
Proposition 7. Suppose vt e Vt n(v',1). Giuen an arbitrary firs[-period incen-
tiue scheme St, Iet x" (xT) denote the corresponding strategies ojagent H when
the principa! precommits to PIS (TIS) jor the second period. We haue xT?xP;
and ijxPE(0, t), XT)XP.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that in Proposition 7 we use a common first-period incentive scheme
for both systems. This allows us to focus on the relative ratchet-ef(ect
implications of different commitment policies w.r.t. future periods. ln this
context, the value of 1-x" is the legitimate indicator of the seriousness of the
ratchet effect since it is linearly and positively related to the probability that
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a first-period incentive scheme does not attain a separation [see (45)]. Using
this indicator we have shown in Proposition 7 that committing to TIS in the
second period always mitigates the ratchet effect, provided that vl e V, and
v, ~ v'.
If we substitute x for x" and vZ-vt~(v,t(1-vt)(1-x)) for v2 into (57) and
(58), for a fixed first-period incentive scheme, the total discounted expected
welfare may be viewed as a function of z. Denote this function by
E(WP,x~b,,vl) and E(WT,xI(t,,~t),v,), respectively.
Proposition 8. For vl e Vi ( vl e V~) and a giuen first-period incentiue scheme
(T„a„Qt) [(at,bt)~, iÍ~t~~~(y`(H)) Lbt~~~(Y'(H))~, then
dE(WT~zdzTt,Qt),vt)~0 rdE(WPdxlbt,v~)~Ol.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 8 suggests that the total discounted expected welfare increases
with the probability of separation. It confirms the undesirability of the
ratchet effect. Another useful observation is given by
Lemma 8. For v, e Vl, and a first-period price-incentiue scheme (a„bi), let
r-min{b,,IV'(y'(H))}. If a first-period target-incentive scheme (it,ál,~l)
satisfies
T,-Y(b,,L), ál-a,-FbtY(bi,1-), ~tE[r,bt~~ (59)
then
E(WT,x~(it,Q~),v~)~E(WP,x~bt,vt),
with strict inequality jor x ~ 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
We eventually come to
Proposition 9. Suppose v, E(v', 1). Then
E1WT,xTI(il(~1),F'!(~I1),YII~E(WP.xP ~bt(vt) ,vl), l6~)
with strict inequality jor vl e Vi.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Admittedly, the above result depends on an endogenous assumption that
v, E(v', 1), which is not satisfactory. We need more restrictions on the benefit
and cost functions to show the general dominance of tlie TIS over PIS.
Assumption 3. 13'(y)-s;
Assumption 4. C„(y, H) Z.IMC,,,(y, H) for all y5 y(s, H), where M - maxxss~
y(x, H) - y(x, L)~, y( ~, 6) being the inverse function of C,(., (l).
Assumption 3 is the case considered in Freixas et al. (1985). It may be
justified by regarding the output y as a money return and assume that the
principal is a risk-neutral wealth maximizer. Assumption 4 poses a further
restriction on the cost structures. But note that it is still general enough to
encompass a large class of situations. For instance, it is always satisfied when
C,,,.~C„ is small, or when ~ is small.
Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 3 and 4(i) nT(v)SnP(v) jor all vE(~~,1);
thus (ii) for all v, e[0, 1]
E(WT,xT~(Tt(vt),Í;t(vt),v,)~E(WP,xP~bt(vt),vt), (b1)
with strict inequality jor vl e VT.
Proof. (i) Write ~-(1 ~-.i)v~(.i~-v) and 6,-~sf(1 -~)(3. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose for some ve(v, 1), nT(v)~nP(v). We must have t~
y(b, L) and bt ~ b for otherwise ( t, a, Q) will be below (a, b) for all the values of
y, which implies nTSnP. From the definition of a" it follows that
C(t, L) - C(y(b, L), L) f b[y(Q, H) - y(b, H) -(r - y(b, L))]
f(Q - b)(Y(Q, N) - t) -[C(Y(Q, H), H) - C(Y(b, H), H)7 ~ 0. (62)
Let D(x) -C(y(x, L), L) -by(x, L), D'(b) -0. By Taylor's expansion, and using
the facts C„(y(x, B), B) y'(x, 9) - 1 and y" 5 0,




- C„(Y(~, L), L)Y2(~, L)
(b, Z b)
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t C~Y(y( ~, L). W- b]y"( ~, L) (bT
- b) z
5 y'(b, L) (b` 2 6)2 (6 5~ S b~).
2
Similarly, we have
bCy(Q, H) -Y(b, H)] - CC(Y(Q, H), H) - C(y(b, F1), H)]
~ -Y(b,H)(b-Q)2.2
Thus, from ( 62) it follows that
Y (b, L)C~(s -Q)-(b-Q)]Z -y (b, H)(b-Q)2? 2Ly(Q, f1) -z)(b-Q)]. (63)
Substituting ( 2S) into ( 63) and manipulating terms yields:
Y(b, L)~(~(s-I~))Z -2y'(b, W~~(s-Q)(b-Q)
?(b- Q) 2 L(1 f 2~)Y(b, H) -~Y(b, L)]
t(I t:~)(b-Q)(2s-b-Q)Y(6,1~)
-2(1 f ~)(S-Q)(6-Q)~Y'(6,11) -Y (Q, H)]. (64)
which, by Assumption 1 and the fact that s-b~(1 -rb)(s-Q), implies
y'(6,L)~(s-Q)v?(b-Q) L2vy'(b,L)f(~~ v)(2-~)Y(b,H) J
t2(~~ v)(b-Q)CY(Q,H)-y'(b,H)]- l65)
On the other hand, recalling that t- y(b„ L), from (2S) we have
(s-Q)( l - v)1''(Q, f1)
i.( I - v)
- ((tÀ) Cy(Q,f1)-Y(b,W-(t-Y(b,L))]
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~ ~( t - v) [Y(Q, H) -Y(b, W -Y(b, L)~(s - R)].- (t t~l)
Subtracting (32) from (66) and manipulating terms yields:
Y'(b, L)~(s-Q)v
5(b-Q) L ~'Y(b,L)f(1 -v) 11f~i y(b'H)]
-~(1 -v)r(s-(3)f(b-Q) 1 f~][Y
(Q,H)-Y(b,F1))]
-(b-Q)LvY (b,l-)f(1 -~') ll
f~ZY(b,F1)
(66)
-(1 -v)r(s-b)t(b-Q) 11 f2~ï
]Y~(n,H)J (Q~n~b). (67)
Comparing (65) with (67) we derive
vY (b' L) } 1 f 7. Y(b,
H) ~ -(1 - v)(s - b)Y~~(h, H)- (68)
Notice that (1 - v)y'(Q, H) 5 vy'(b, L) t(1 - v)y'(b, H) [compare ( 25) and (32)].
Expression ( 68) thus implies
y(n, H) ~ -(1 f .i)(s - q)Y~( n, H).
Using the facts that C,,Yy( y')2 f Cy,,y" - 0 and ( s- t~) y'(q, H) ~[1,~(1 t~)] M [sce
(25)], we must have
Crr(Y(~1, H), H) c.l.MCrrr(Y(r1, H), H)-
But this is a contradiction to Assumption 4. Thus ( i) is provcd.
(ii) This is an immediate coroUary of Proposition 9 and (i). Q.E.D.
Remarks. (1) If different incentive systcros are committed to in each period, it
is easily seen that choosing the TIS for both periods strictly dominates
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choosing the TIS and the PIS in the first period and the second period,
respectively, and at least weakly dominates choosing the PIS in the first
period and the TIS in the second period.
(2) The proof that the high productivíty agent enjoys less information
rents in the TIS than in the PIS is unexpectedly complicated (Proposition
10). Perhaps this is why the intuition behind this observation is so hard to
get. I find it particularly difficult to conjecture whether this fact stems from
the highly stylized model construction, or there is any intrinsic logic lying at
the bottom.
(3) On the other hand, even if we could find an instance where the above
observation is false (as suggested by Assumptions 3 and 4, such an instance
would have to be found with more complex benefit and~or cost functions),
we are not sure that the PIS would then outperform the TIS. The dynamic
losses of adopting the more general incentive system, if any, would then have
to be compared with the likely static gains, and it would be hard to draw a
general conclusion.
5. Summary and remarks
This paper has undertaken a comparative analysis of incentive systems in
the context of a repeated principal-agent relationship with adverse selection
and ratchet effects. Two widely used incentive systems, the price-incentive
system (PIS) and the target-incentive system (TIS), are analyzed and their
associated (total discounted) expected welfare levels attained at the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium are compared. The principal is assumed to be commit-
ted to a particular incentive system for the whole planning horizon, whereas
the parameters of the system, or in other words, the specific schemes, are
allowed to be revised periodically. Under such a framework the ratchet effect
is evident, but varies with different incentive systems. The comparison is
carried out through careful examinations of equilibrium strategies and beliefs
under each incentive system. It is found that employing the T1S can lead to a
higher probability of early truth revelation than the PIS without creating
extra costs for the principal. This fact together with the strict welfare
dominance of TIS over PIS in static settings (proved in section 3) allows us
to conclude that the TIS also strictly outperforms the PIS in multi-period
relationships.
From a positive point of view, this result provides some justification for
the frequent use of targets, quotas, etc. for certain (controlled) economic
variables in hierarchical organizations, such as in planned economies or
multinational private firms. Namely, under asymmetric information, a system
that allows the central authority or headquarters only to control transfer
prices (with lump-sum transfers) can be improved by allowing them to
stipulate minimal required targets as well.
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From the normative point of view, our analysis might serve as an initial
step towards optimal incentive system design for long-term decentralized
planning with periodic scheme revisions. If scheme commitment is possible,
the problem of optimal system design is trivial since any optimal inter-
temporal schemes chosen from a particular incentive system belong also to a
more general system, i.e. the more general the system is, the better. If scheme
commitment is impossible, then there is a trade-ofT: on the one hand, given
the fact that any dynamic relationship governed by equilibrium short-term
schemes can be duplicated by a long-term scheme, the optimum attained at
the equilibria with short-term incentive schemes unconstrained by any
incentive system" might be improved if the principal can precommit to a
particular incentive system; on the other hand, if the incentivc system is too
restrictive, as is the case with the PIS, relaxing commitment can improve
welfare. Thus, the interest in designing optimal long-term incentive systems
for relationships governed by short-term contracts (schemes) is justified.
Existing analyses, in one way or another, have only been comparative,
focusing on simplified incentive structures descriptive of actual arrangements,
and have not addressed the admittedly difTicult problem of optimality. But
perhaps a normative theory of optimal incentive system design may emerge
through a'tatónnement' process of judicious comparative analyses.
A target-incentive scheme can be seen as a piece-linear function with a
kink at the target level. A follow-up of this study might be to investigate how
piece-linear schemes with two or more kinks work. For instance, given two
systems of piece-linear incentive schemes, is it true that the one always
outperforms the other if the former allows more kinks for the schemc
structure? For such investigations to make sense, we might have to extend
the model to allow for more than two possible types of agents. Although
analytical difficulties are inevitable, the qualitative result in this paper seems
likely to hold as well.
The present model involves only a pure adverse selection type of informa-
tional asymmetry, where the agent is assumed to possess complete infor-
mation concerning the production environment. How results may alter in the
presence of output uncertainty and moral hazard, or when there is both
moral hazard and adverse selection, seems to be also an interesting as well as
promising topic for further research.
Appendix
ProoJoj Proposition 1. Let t-V - E( WT I(t, Q), v). For v E(vT, l), the first-order
conditions for an optimal (t, ~ in (22) are
13LaRont and Tirole ( 1988) have developed techniyues for designing optimal sequential
incentive schemes in a repeated principal-agent xtting without precommitment to an incentive
system.
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W,-v(1-F~:t)[N'(t)-Cy(t,L)]-(1-v).i[C,,(t,L)-Q]-0, (69)
WB -(1 - v) L(1 f J.)(~~(Y(Q~ 1~)) - Q)Y'(Q, H) -Z(Y(Q, H) - t)] - 0. (70)
Conditions (24) and ( 25) foUow immediately from ( 69) and ( 70). Furthermore,
one may verify that
W„ -~l(1 f~i) [N„(t) - C,,,,(T, L)] -.1(1- v)C,,,,(t, L) ~0, (71)
W 1- v)(1 f.i) L AÍ„(Y(Q,1~)) ~dY(Q,
H)~z
BB - ( ` dQ
t(N~(Y(Q,F1))-Q)dzd~2H) - llf~ Y(Q.H) J ~O, (72)
W,B-~(1 -v)~0. (73)
Eqs. (71) and (73) are obvious (l~"~O,C,,,,~0). Eq. (72) comes from
Assumption 1 and condition (20). By Assumptions 1 and 2, the Jacobian of
(69) and (70):
J - W~~WBB -( wiB)2
?(.1 f v)Cy,,(r, L)(1- v)( l f 2.i)Y(Q, H) -~z(1 - v)z
?[(1 f v)C,,,.(Y(Q, L), L)(1 f 2~1) -.iz(1 - v)Cyy(1'(Q, H), H)]
x (1 - v) y'(Q, H)
~ 0. (74)
Eqs. (71)-{74) show that the second-order condition for the maximization
problem ( 22) is satisfied. Thus, by the assumption that the production is
worth carrying out with both types of agents, T and Q exist and are uniquely
determined by (69) and ( 70). By the Implicit Function Theorem, t(v) and Q(v)
are also well defined and differentiable on (vT, l). Finally, we notice that a(v)
is uniquely determined by (2l).
Proposition 2 will show that the constraint (23) is not binding at this
optimal solution. Q.E.D.
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Prooj oj Lemma2. For ve(v",1), suppose (i(v),a(v),Q(v))Eri and
(a(v), b(v)) E !'P are optimal schemes to Pi and PP, respectively.
(i) Let l~ - E( WT I(i, ~), v), as was defined in (22). We have
Wri(v)fW,B~(v)--[(lfa)(N'(i)-Cy(i,~-))f~(Cy(i.~-)-i)]. (75)
WB,i~(v) f ~VBB~f ( v)-O. (7b)
In (71), (72), and (73) it is shown that ~TI~O, WBB ~O, and WLB ~O. The
matrix determinant J of eqs. (75) and (76) is shown to be positive for all
vE(v", l) [see (74)]. Let B denote the right-hand side of (75). By Proposition
2, BGO. It follows that
B W:B




(ii) Let W- E( WP I 6, v), as was defined in (31). We have
W""b'( v) -(N'(Y(b, N)) - b)Y(b, H)
-(N'(Y(b, ~-)) - b)Y(b, L) - 1 f .i (Y(b, y) -Y(b, L)). (77)
Let D denote the right-hand side of (77). From ( 32) and (33) we can derive
that D ~ 0. Similar to (i), from the second-order condition W"" G O. b'(v) -
D~W""~0. Q.E.D.
Prooj oj Lemma 4. Write ~-(1 f.l)v~(:tf v). Let y(.,L) be the inverse
function of Cy(~, L). By Assumption 1, y" 50. From (24) and by the mcan
value theorem we have
i-Y(~IV'(i).i-(1 -~)Q,L)
c Y(~, ~-) f Y(i,1-)~(~'( i) - Q).
Thus, from (25):
(~'(Y(Q, H)) -Q)Y(~. H) ~ t -~1-.1 CY(~, H) -Y(~, L) -Y(~, L)~ÍN'(i) -Q)J.
Í78)
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Multiplying (78) by ( 1-v) and adding v(N~(t)-~3))y'(~3,L) to both sides
yields:
v(N~(T)-Í~)Y~(Q,L)-~(1 - v)(N~(Y(Q,H))-~)Y~(~,f1)
- À(1 - ~') (Y(Í~, H) -Y(R, W ~ ~v(N~(t) -i~))Y (~, L) ~ 0.1 fi
Comparing this inequality with the first-order condition for an optimal
price scheme ( 32) we derive that if Q were the price for a price scheme it
would not be optimal. By the concavity of E( WP ~ b, v), therefore, Q(v) ~
b(v). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposi[ion 6. Let us consider E(WT,xT~(r,,~3,),vl). Since y(~i,,H),
defined in ( 20), is continuous in ~, on
X- i(Tl, Íil ) ~ TI ~ 0; CylTt, H) c~t ~ Cylil, L)}.
by (51), (53), (SS), and (49), Wi(L), W1(L~H), W~(H), and WT(T,,~3,) are all
continuous in (t,,~3,) on X. The relationship between v2 and (r„~3,) is
specified by the equilibrium conditions (40), (41), and (43). From the
continuity and Ihe strict monotonicity of nT(v2), we may define a continuous




is a continuous function from X onto [v,, 1]. On the other hand, from (44)
we have xT(v2)-(vZ-v,)~(vZ(1-v,)) eontinuous from [v,, 1] onto [0, 1].
Now it is clear that, being a compound of continuous functions,
E( WT, xT ~(t, ,~S, ), v, ) is continuous on X. Note that the target T, specifies a
minimal output. Increasing r, will eventually lead to a total cost of
production (even for agent H) higher than the total benefit, making
E( WT, xT ~(t, ,(i, ), v, ) ~ 0. Therefore the maximum of the total discounted
expected welfare must be attained at some internal points of X. Eventually
this interior solution can be compared with the separating solution,
(1- v, )(1 t b) W'(H), and the best one leads to a PB equilibrium. Similar
arguments apply also to the PIS. Q.E.D.
~T(t t, ~, ) ~ anT(v t ),
B(~T(TI.NI),a), anT(vl)C~T(Tl,{'1)G(STCT(1-),
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ProoJoj Proposicion 7. Suppose vl e V, n(v', 1). According to Proposition 5,
there may be three types of equilibria. If xP-O, there is no need for further
proof. If xP-1, then i2(S,)?SnP(1-) ~SnT(t-), hence xT-1 as well. If
xP E(0, 1), from ( 43) and the fact that vZ ~ v, ~ v',
S2(S, ) - bnP(v2)1 brzT(vi).
The posterior belief, v2, will be determined from
v2 - max { v E [v', 1] I i2(S, ) Z bnT(v)}.
(79)
(80)
Eqs. (79) and (80), together with the fact that nT(v) increases in v, imply that
v2 ~ v2. It follows from (44) that xT ~ xP. Q.E.D.
ProojojProposition8. LetEWT-E(WT,xI(il,(3,),v,),EWP-E(WP,Y~b,,v,).





d W~ v dv l
fS (v,f(1-v,)(1-x)) a}(-Z)dXf(I-v,)(W'(N)-W"(ti'z)) J .z
i~, ~ N'(Y'(11)),
W;(H) - W;(L~H)
- N(Y(Q,, H)) - C(YÍQ, ,11), H) -~[C(t,, L) f~~ (Y(~~,, H) - r, )~
-[N(i,)-C(T1,H)-.lC(t,, W7




~ (1 f ,~)(~~(Y'(H)) - ~, )(Y(~,, N) - t, )
86 L. Zou, Turget-incentiue sys~em us. price-incentiue systrm
Similarly, W~(H)-W;(L~H)~0 for 61513'(y'(H)). Now write W"(v2)-
v2W~(L)f(1 - vZ)W2(H), with WZ(9), 9-L, H, denoting the welfare with the






dx -(vl f(1 -vi)(1 -x))2.
Substituting (82) and (83) into (81) gives
d E W"
dx -(1 -vi)~(Wi(H)-Wi(L~H))fb(W`(H)-Wi(H))~~0,
since W~(H)? WZ(H). Q.E.D.
(82)
(83)
ProoJ oJ Lemmu 8. Substitute (S9) into (SO)~SS). By comparing terms we
have W;(L)-WP(L), W;(L~H)-W~(L~H), W;(H)?W;(H), and WT(v2)?




tv[v, f(1 - v,)(1 -x)](WT(v~)- WP(vi))
with strict inequality for x c 1. Q.E.D.
ProojoJProposition 9. First consider the case where (v', 1)~ Vl.
(a) Suppose that the equilibrium with (al(v~),b,(vl)) is pooling. This
means that the agcnt H's first-period strategy is xP-O. Consider a target-
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incentive scheme ( í,,á,,~,) defined in (59) with respect to (a,,b,). Since
~, ~ IV'(}~'(H)), from Proposition 8 and Lemma 8:
E(WT,xT~(ït,I]t),v,))?E(WT,O~(í,,Í],),vt)~E(WP,0~6~,ti',).
hcnce (60).
(b) Suppose that the equilibrium with (a,(v,),b,(v,)) is separating. Let
(i„á,, ~, ) be such that
i, - y(b,, L),
á, -a, f b,Y(b,, L), (84)
Qt -6,.
By Proposition 5 and Lemma 5:
nT(il,~l)-i2P(b,)?bnP(1-)7SnT(1 -).
Therefore (íl,ál, f},) also achieves a separating equilibrium. It is straight-
forward to verify that
EIWi, 1 ~(ít,Í]i),vt)-E(WP, 1 ~bt.vt)- (85)
In a separating equilibrium the total discounted expected welfare reduces to
E(Wi, 1 I(ít,~t),vt)-vi Wi(L)f(1 - vt)Wi(H)
f b[vl W'(L) f(1 - v, )W ~(H)].
The first part, vl W;(L) f( 1- v, ) W~(H), is identical to the static expected
welfare in ( I S). By Proposition 4, (ï,, á„ ~, ) is not statically optimal. Noting
that the remaining part, S[v, W'(L) f (1 - v, ) W'(H)], is a constant, by the




to find another first-period target-incentive scheme (t,,a,,~f,) such that
E( WT, 1 I(T 1, Q, ), v, )~ E( WT, 1 I(í l, ~, ) , v, ). Therefore ( 60) must hold.
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(c) Suppose (u,(v,),b,(v,)) induces a semi-separating equilibrium. Let
(t,,á,,(3,) be defined as in (84). By Proposition 7 and Proposition 5:
~TIT 1 . l~ I ) - ~P(61 ) - b7[P(v2) J b1rT(v2), (g6)
since vZ ~ v, ? 'v.
(i) First consider ~, SIV'(y`(H)). The continuation equilibrium requires
that the principal's posterior belief, v2, in the TIS be determined from
v2 - max { v e[v2, I] ~ f1T(T,, ~i, )? bnT(v)}.
Eq. (86) and the increasing property of n" indicate that vZ ~ v~, hence xT 1 xP.
Expression ( 60) follows readily from Proposition 8.
(ii) Next consider ~, ~!3'(y'(H)). Define a new piece-bonus ~T as
~T-min {IfI i~?N'(y'(H))~ ~T(Tt,Q)?brrT(vi)}.
Diffcrentiating (49) yields f1ó(T,,~,)-y(~,,H)-i,~0, thus ~i~~3,. The pos-
tcrior belief with the first-period target-incentive scheme (i„á,,~) will be
vZ -max {ve [v2,1] ~ f?(i,,~)zBaT(v)}. (87)
If ]~~lV'(y'(H)), then i2T(T,,~)-bnT(v2), and by (87), v2-vZ. Therefore the
corresponding strategy is xT-xP. Since ~iL(],, from Lemma 8 we know that
(60) holds. If ]1-I~'(y'(H)), then ilT(í,,~)]brrT(v2) and xT1xP. From
Proposition 8 and Lemma 8 it follows that
E(WTexTI(ilrY),vl)1E(WT,xPI(Tl,(~),~l)1E(WT, xPlbl~vl)~
(d) By the definition of V~ and from what we have shown, it follows that
V; n(v', 1) s V; n(v", 1) and the set inclusion is strict if V; c(v', 1). Thus, if
v, ~ V;, then v, ~ V;, and in both systems the principal achieves the same
welfare level ( l- v, )(1 t b)W"(H). Finally, if v, E V; but v, ~ V;, then by the
very definition of Vi the strict inequality in (61) still holds.
(e) The case with v, -0 or v, - 1 is trivial. Q.E.D.
References
Baron, D.P. and R. Myerson, 1982, Regulating a monopolist with unknown cosls, Econometrica
50, 91I-930.
['reixas, X., R. Guesnerie and J. Tirole, 1985, Planning under incomplete information and the
ratchct eRcct, Review of Economic Studies 52, 173-191.
Grecn, J. and 1J. LatTont, 1977, Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of
pre(erences for public goods, Econometrica 45, 427-438.
L. Zou, Target-incenriue system us. price-incentiue sysrem 89
Guesnerie, R. and J.J. LalTont, 1984, A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems
with an application to the control of a self-managed firm, lournal of Public Economics 25,
329-369.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1979, Optimal incentive contracts with imperfecl information, lournal
of Economic Theory 20, 231-259.
Holmstrom, B., 1982, Design of incentive schemes and the new soviet incentive moJel, Europcan
Economic Review 17, 127-148.
Holmstrëm, B. and P. Milgrom, 1987, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertem-
poral incentives, Econometrica 55, no. 2, March, 303-328.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson, 1982, Sequential equilibria, Econometrica 50, 863-894.
LalTont, J.-J. and 1. Tirole, 1986, Using cost observation to rcgulate firms, lournal of Political
Economy 94, 614-641.
LalTont, 1.-J. and 1. Tirole, 1986, Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic contract, European
Economic Review 31, 901-926.
LalTont, 1: J. and J. Tirole, 1988, The dynamics of incentive contracts, Econometrica 56, no. 5,
1153-1175.
Maskin, E. and I. Riley, 1984, Monopoly with incomplete information, Rand Journal of
Economics I5, no. 2, 171-I96.
Mirrlees, J.A., 1971, An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation, Review of
Economic Sludies 38, 175-208.
Schelling, T.C., 1956, An essay on bargaining, The American Economic Review 46, no. 3,
281-306.
Wcitzman, M., 1980, The 'ratchet principlè and performance incentives, Bell Journal of
Economícs, Spring, 302-308.
Reprint Series, CentER. Tilburg Univercity, The Netherlands:
No. 1 G. Merini and F. van der Ploeg, Monetary and flacal polícy in an
optimising model with capital accumulation and finite lives,
The Economic Journal, vol. 98, no. 392, 1988, pp. 772 - 786.
No. 2 F. van der Ploeg, International policy coordination in interdependent
monetary economies, Journal of International Economics., vol. 25,
1988. PP. 1 - 23.
No. 3 A.P. Barten, The history of Dutch macroeconomic modellíng
(1936-1986), ín W. Driehuis, M.M.G. Fase and H. den Hartog (eds.),
Challenges for Macrceconomíc Modelling, Contributiona to Economic
Analysis 178, Amsterdam: North-Hollend, 1988. PP. 39 - 88.
No. 4 F. van der Ploeg, Disposable income, unemployment, inflation end
state spending in s dynamic political-economic model, Public Choice,
vol. 60. 1989. PP. 211 - 239.
No. 5 Th. ten Raa and F. van der Plceg, A statistical approach to the
problem of negatives in input-output analysis, Economic Modelling,
vol. 6, no. 1, 1989. pP. 2- 19.
No. 6 E. van Damme. Renegotiatíon-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners'
dilemma, Joucnal of Economic Theory, vol. 47, no. 1, 1989,
PD- 206 - 217.
No. 7 C. Mulder and F. van der Plceg, Trade unions, investment and
employment in a small open economy: a Dutch perspective, in J.
Muysken and C, de Neubourg ( eds.), Unemployment in Europe, London:
The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989. pP. 2~ - 229.
No. 8 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Ploeg, Wage rigidity end capital
mobility in an optimizing model of a small open economy, De Economist
137, nr. 1, 1989. PP. 47 - 75.
No. 9 G. Dhaene and A.P. Barten, When it all begen: the 1936 Tinbergen
model revisited, Economic Modelling, vol. 6, no. 2, 1989.pP. 203 - 219.
No. 10 F. van der Plceg and A.J. de Zeeuw, Conflict over arms accumulation
in market and command economies, in F. van der Ploeg and A.J. de
Zeeuw (eds.), Dynamic Policy Games in Economics, Contrlbutions to
Economic Analysis 181, Amaterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
(North-Holland), 1989. pP. 91 - 119.
No. 11 J. Driffill, Macroeconomic policy games wi[h incomplete information:
some extensions, in F. van der Ploeg and A.J. de Zeeuw (eds.),
Dynamic Policy Cames in Economics, Contributions to Economíc Analysis
181, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland),
1989, pp. 289 - 3z2.
No. 12 F. van der Ploeg, Towards monetary integration in Eucope, in P. De
Gcauwe e.a., De Europese Monetaire InteRretie: vier visies,
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid V 66, 's-Gravenhage:
SDU uitgeverij, 1989, pp. 81 - 106.
No. 13 R.J.M. Alessie and A. Kapteyn, Consumption, savings and demogrephy,
in A. Wenig, K.F. Zimmermann (eds.), Demographic Change and Economic
Development, Berlin~Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1989. pp- 272 - 305.
No. 14 A. Hoque, J.R. Magnus end B. Pesaran, The exact multi-period meen-
square forecast error for the first-order autoregressive model,
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 39. no. 3. 1988. pp. 327 - 346.
No. 15 R. Alessie, A. Kapteyn end B. Melenberg, The effects of liquidity
constraints on consumption: estimation from household panel data,
European Economic Review 33, no. 2~3, 1989. PP. 547 - 555-
No. 16 A. Holly and J.R. Magnus, A note on instrumental variables and
meximum likelihood estimation procedures, Annales d'Économie et de
Statistique, no. 10, April-June, 1988, pp. 121 - 138.
No. 17 P. ten Hacken, A. Kapteyn end I. Woittiez, Unemployment benefits and
the labor market, a micro~mecro approach, in B.A. Custafsson end N.
Anders Klevmarken (eds.), The Political Economy of Sociel Security,
Contributions to Economic Analyais 179, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1989, pp. 143 - 164.
No. 18 T. Wansbeek and A. Kapteyn, Estimation of the error-components model
with incomplete panels, Journal of Econometrícs, vol. 41, no. 3,
1989. pp. 341 - 361.
No. 19 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman and R. Willemse, Some methodological issues
in the implementetion of subjective poverty definitions, The Journal
of Human Resources, vol. 23, no. 2, 1988, pp. 222 - 242.
No. 20 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Ploeg, Fiscal policy and finite
lives i n interdependent economies with real and nominal wage
rigidity, Oxford Economic Pacers, vol. 41, no. 3. 1989. pp. 459 -
489.
No. 21 J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The exact multi-period mean-square
forecast error for the first-order autoregressive model with an
intercept. Journel of Econometrics, vol. 42, no. 2, 1989.
pp. 157 - 179.
No. 22 F. van der Plceg, Two easays on political economy: (i) The political
economy of overvaluation, The Economic Journal, vo1. 99, no. 397.
1989. pp. 850 - 855~ (11) Election outcomes and the stockmarket,
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1989, pp. 21 -
30.
No. 23 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Woodlend, On the meximum likelihood estimation
of multivariete regression models containing serially correlated
error components, International Economic Review, vol. 29, no. 4,
1988. pp. 707 - 725.
No. 24 A.J.J. Talman and Y. Yamamoto, A simplícial algorithm for stationary
point problems on polytopes, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol.
14, no. 3. 1989. pp. 383 - 399.
No. 25 E. van Damme, Stable equilibris and forward índuction, Journal of
Economic Theory, vol. 48, no. 2, 1989, pp. 476 - 496.
No. 26 A.P. Barten and L.J. Bettendorf, Price formation of fish: An
application of an inverse demand system, European Economíc Review,
vol. 33. no. 8. 1989, PP. 1509 - 1525.
No. 27 G. Noldeke and E. van Damme, Signalling in a dynamic labour market,
Revíew of Economic Studies, vol. 57 (1), no. 189. 1990, pp. 1- 23
No. 28 P. Kop Jansen and Th. ten Raa, The choice of model in the
construction of input-output coefficients matrices, International
Economic Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 1990, pp. 213 - 227.
No. 29 F. van der Ploeg and A.J. de Zeeuw, Perfect equilíbrium in a model of
competitive arms accumulation, International Economic Review, vol.
31, no. 1, 1990, pp. 131 - 146.
No. 30 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Woodland, Separability end aggregation,
Economica, vol. 57. no. 226, 1990. PP. 239 - 247-
No. 31 F. van der Ploeg, Internetional interdependence and policy
coordination in economies with real and nominal wage rigidity, Greek
Economic Review, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1988, pp. 1- 48.
No. 32 E. van Damme, Signaling and forward induction in a market entry
context, Operations Research Proceedings 1989. Berlin-Heidelberg:
Springer-Verlag, 1990. PP. 45 - 59.
No. 33 A.P. Barten, Toward a levels version of the Rotterdam and related
demand systems, Contributions to 0 erationa Research and Economics,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 19 9. pP. 1- 65.
No. 34 F. van der Ploeg, International coordination of monetary policies
under alternative exchange-rate regimes, Advanced Lectures in
puanticative Economics, London-Orlando: Academic Presa Ltd., 1990,
PP- 91 - 121.
No. 35 Th. van de Klundert, On sociceconomic causes of 'wait unemployment',
European Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 5, 1990, pp. 1011 - 1022.
No. 36 R.J.M. Alessie, A. Kapteyn, J.B. van Lochem end T.J. Wansbeek,
Indivídual effects in utility consístent models of demand, in J.
Hartog, G. Riddec and J. Theeuwes (eds.), Panel Data end Labor
Market Studies, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-
Holland), 1990. PP. 253 - 278.
No. 37 F. van der Ploeg, Capital accumulatíon, infletion and long-run
conflict in international objectives, Oxford Economic Papers, vol.
42, no. 3. 1990. PP. 501 - 525.
No. 38 Th. NiJman and F. Palm, Parameter identification in ARMA Processes in
the presence of regular but incomplete sampling, Journal of Time
Series Analysis, vol. 11, no. 3. 1990. PP. 239 - 248.
No. 39 Th. van de Klundert, Wage differentials and employment in a two-
sector model with a dual labour market, Metroeconomica, vol. 40, no.
3. 1989. pp. 235 - 256.
No. 40 Th. Nijman and M.F.J. Steel, Exclusion restrictions in instrumental
variables equations, Econometric Reviews, vol. 9, no. 1, 1990. PP. 37
- 55.
No. 41 A. van Scest, I. Woittiez and A. Kapteyn, Labor supply, income taxes,
end hours restrictions in the Netherlands, Journal of Human
Resources, vol. 25, no. 3. 1990, pp. 517 - 558.
No. 42 Th.C.M.J. van de Klundert and A.B.T.M. van Schaik, Unemployment
persistence and loss of productive capacity: a Keynesian approach,
Journal of Macrceconomics, vol. 12, no. 3. 1990, pp. 363 - 380.
No. 43 Th. Nijman and M. Verbeek, Estimation of time-dependent parameters in
linear models using cross-sections, panels, or both, Journal of
Econometrics, vol. 46, no. 3. 1990. Pp. 333 - 346.
No. 44 E. van Demme, R. Selten and E. Winter, Alternating bid bargaining
with a amallest money unit, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 2,
no. 2, 1990, pp. 188 - 201.
No. 45 C. Dang, The D1-triangulation of Tn for simplicial algorithms for
computing solutions of nonlinear equations, Mathematics of Operations
Research, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991, pp. 148 - 161.
No. 46 Th. Nijman end F. Palm, Predictive accuracy gain from disaggregate
sempling in ARIMA models, Journal of Business d, Economic Statistics,
vol. 8, no. 4, 1990, pp. 405 - 15.
No. 47 J.R. Magnus, On certain moments relating to ratios of quadratic forms
in normal variablea: further results, Sankhya: The Indien Journal of
Statistics, vol. 52, aeries B, part. 1, 1990, pp. 1- 13.
No. 48 M.F.J. Steel, A Bayeaian analysis of simultaneous equation models by
combining recursíve analytical and nuooerical approaches, Journal of
Econometrics, vol. 48, no. 1~2, 1991, pp. 83 - 117.
No. 49 F. ven der Plceg end C. Withagen, Pollution control end the ramsey
problem, Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991,
PP. 215 - 23 .
No. 50 F. van der Plceg, Money and capital in interdependent economies with
overlepping generations, Economica, vol. 58, no. 230, 1991,
PP. 233 - 256.
No. 51 A. Kapteyn and A. de Zeeuw, Changing incentives for economic research
in the Netherlands, European Economic Review, vo1. 35, no. 2~3, 1991,
pP. 603 - 611.
No. 52 C.O, de Vries, On the reletion between GARCH and stable processes,
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 48, no. 3. 1991. PP. 313 - 324.
No. 53 R. Alessie and A. Kapteyn, Habit formation, interdependent prefer-
ences and demographic effects in the almost ideal demand system, The
Economic Journal, vol. 101, no. 406, 1991, pP. 404 - 419.
No. 54 W. van Groenendaal and A. de Zeeuw, Control, coordination and
conflict on international commodity markets, Economic Modelling, vol.
8, no. 1, 1991, pp. 90 - 101.
No. 55 F. van der Plceg and A.J. Markink, Dynamic policy ín linear models
with rational expectatíona of future eventa: A computer package,
Computer Science in Economics and Management, vol. 4, no. 3, 1991,
pp. 1~5 - 199.
No. 56 R.A. Keuzenkamp and F. van der Plceg, Savings, investment, government
finance, and the current account: The Dutch experience, in C.
Alogoskoufis, L. Papademos and R. Portes (eds.), Externel Constreints
on Macroeconomic Polic : The Euro ean Ex erience, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991. PP. 219 - 2 3.
No. 57 Th. Nijman, M. Verbeek and A. van Soest, The efficiency of rotating-
panel designs in an analysis-of-variance model, Journal of
Econometrics, vol. 49, no. 3. 1991. PP. 373 - 399.
No. 58 M.F.J. Steel and J.-F. Richard, Bayesian multivariate exogeneity
analysis - an application to a UK money demand equation, Journal of
Econometrics, vol. 49, no. 1~2, 1991, pp. 239 - 274.
No. 59 Th. Nijman and F. Palm, Generalized least squares estimation of
linear models containing rational Future expectations, International
Economic Review, vol. 32, no. 2, 1991. PP. 383 - 389.
No. 60 E. van Damme, Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games, Revista Espanola
de Economis, vol. 8, no. 1, 1991. PP. 37 - 52.
No. 61 E. Bennett and E. van Demme, Demend commitment bargaining: the case
of apex games, i n R. Selten ( ed.), Game Equilibrium Models III -
Strategic Bargaining, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 118 - 140.
No. 62 W. GUth end E. van Damme, Gorby games - a game theoretic analysis of
disarmament campaigns and the defense efficiency - hypothesis -, in
R. Avenhaus, H. Karkar and M. Rudnianski (eds.), Defense Decision
Making - Analytical Support and Crisis Management, Berlin: Springer-
Verlag. 1991, pp. 215 - 240.
No. 63 A. Roell, Dual-capacity trading and the quality of the market,
Journel of Financiel Intermediation, vol. 1, no. 2, 199G,
PP. 105 - 124.
No. 64 Y. Dai, G. van der Laan, A.J.J. Talman and Y. Yamamoto. A simpliciel
algorithm for the nonlinear stationary point problem on an unbounded
polyhedron, Siam Journal of Optimizatíon, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, pp.
151 - 165.
No. 65 M. McAleer and C.R. McKenzie, Keynesian and new classical models of
unemployment revisited, The Economic Jouriial, vol. 101, no. 406,
1991, pP. 359 - 381.
No. 66 A.J.J. Talman, Ceneral equilibrium programming, Nieuw Archief voor
wiskunde, vol. 8, no. 3. 1990, pp. 387 - 397.
No. 67 J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The bias of forecasts from a fírst-order
autoregression, Econometric Theory, vol. 7, no. 2, 1991, pp. 222 -
235.
No. 68 F. van der Plceg, Macroeconomic policy coordination issues during the
varíous phasea of economic and monetary integration in Europe,
European Economy - The Economics of EMU, Commission of the European
Communities, specíal edition no. 1, 1991, pp. 136 - 164.
No. 69 H. Keuzenkamp, A precursor to Muth: Tinbergen's 1932 model of
rational expectations, The Economic Journal, vol. 101, no. 408, 1991,
pp. 1245 - 1253.
No. 70 L. Zou, The target-incentive system vs. the price-incentive system
under adverse selection and the ratchet effect, Journal of Public
Economics, vol. 46, no. 1, 1991. pp. 51 - 89.
p,1 Rnx ani ~~ ~nnn i~ Tii Ri iRr Tu~ nicTU~RLANDS
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabanti ui~ u ~ i ~w~~ u n i u
1 7 000 O ~ 1 69733 2
